After only six years in Australia, Besmellah Rezaee has already achieved more than others do in a lifetime. Besmellah works tirelessly on behalf of the Afghanistanis community in Australia, especially through the media.

He co-founded Karawaan Radio for the Hazara Afghanistani community and published the first Dari quarterly magazine, Sokhane-nau, providing his community with an outlet to discuss issues affecting Afghanistani in Australia. With a Bachelor of International Studies and a TOEFL qualification under his belt, Besmellah is in his final year of law at the University of Adelaide.

At university he established the Association of Australian Tertiary Students from Afghanistan, to encourage and help young disadvantaged Afghanistanis undertake and complete tertiary studies. He has represented Australia in international conferences including the 17th Conference of Commonwealth Education Ministers where he coordinated the Youth Forum Group, and the 2010 Asia Pacific Youth Conference in Malaysia.

As a speaker of six languages – Dari, Persian, English, Urdu, Hazaragi and Pushto – Besmellah often acts as a professional interpreter. His deep commitment to social justice and his belief that through sensitive communication, we can learn to respect diverse cultures, have made Besmellah one of the most influential and revered members of his community.

Judges were drawn to his image of a mother and child seemingly in mourning for a man. The pair are from the Hazara tribe – a minority living in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran who have regularly been persecuted in those countries.

Asef used to live in Pakistan before moving to Finchley, in Barnet, 10 years ago. Raising awareness of the unreported plight of the Hazara people is one theme of his photography.

Speaking after his nomination, Asef said: “I’m excited about being nominated for such a prestigious award – but this is just the start, I can’t wait for the rest of the process.”

The environment at Middlesex University was hailed by him as a fruitful place to learn the craft and get the chance of exhibiting at well-known galleries, including the National Potrait Gallery.

A requirement of the Sony panel was for snappers to take on a role similar to that of a haiku poet and create an image that depicts a ‘fleeting moment’, or ‘the decisive moment.’

As a result of making it onto the shortlist, Asef’s image of private emotional moment will be displayed at Somerset House, in the Strand.

Middlesex University BA Photography programme leader, David Simmonds said: “Asef is a talented image maker, he is a caring, insightful and determined young man.

“Together these qualities have enabled Asef to make mature, thought-provoking and sensitive images on often challenging subjects to which he has close personal connections.”

Check out more of Asef’s work at his website; www.asef.co.uk.

Source & copyright

Tragedy of a secret deal

As Afghan authorities probe possible avenues for brokering peace with insurgent forces, the death of a child in a Taliban rocket attack that was sanctioned by the governor of Ghazni Province raises a crucial question: When does harsh pragmatism become a crime?

by Rahmat Alizada , Ghazni , 15.11.2011

Nine-year-old Khatera Rezai was performing evening prayers before supper when the Taliban rocket plunged through the side wall of her home. It was the little girl’s last prayer: pieces of the projectile hit her directly, failing to explode but causing the living room to catch fire. The charge finally detonated as the family members were carrying her out. Khatera died of her injuries in hospital eight hours later.

Her mother and two of her three little brothers were also seriously injured in the incident, which beyond the immediate tragedy for this ordinary family in Ghazni, located 150 kilometres southwest of Kabul, has deeper implications for the overall peace process in Afghanistan.

Because this particular attack was personally authorized by the governor of Ghazni Province, Musa Khan Akbarzada.

“The Ghazni Taliban are under pressure from their superiors for not firing rockets at Ghazni City and for showing readiness to reconcile with the government,” Akbarzada revealed in a shocking announcement two months later at a meeting with tribal elders, journalists and visiting members of the national High Peace Council.

“We therefore permitted them to fire just two rockets at the city. In recent years rockets were constantly fired at Ghazni by the anti-government forces, but [in the past six months] only two rockets were fired at the city with my permission.” (see video link at foot of story)

Fateful decision

Remnants of the rocket that tore into the Rezai family's home, fired in a government concession to local Taliban. (Photos: Alizada)

This wasn’t the first rocket attack in the city this year. Akbarzada’s guest house came under rocket fire in March, but there were no casualties. And since the Towheed Aabaad district has a police station and is located close to US-Polish military base, it is in the sights of the insurgent forces.

But the rockets they use are hand positioned for launch and are hard to target accurately. In April a stray rocket hit Khatera’s school and killed a teacher. This time the victim was a pupil.

“I was on the roof of my house when a rocket fired from Espandi hit the house of the Rezai family,” said the head of the district council, Sayeed Nasrat, who witnessed the explosions and the aftermath. “I went there immediately and saw the whole family soaked in blood and crying.”

“It was eight o’clock in the evening when the rocket hit my brother’s house. The 140-centimetre long and 35-centimetre wide rocket blew up twenty minutes later while everybody was leaving the house to take the injured to hospital,” said Khatera’s uncle, Juma Khan Rezai, who is helping the family while his brother is working overseas. “Khatera was nine years old, a second-grade student who was at the top of her class. She died from serious burns.”

Furious backlash

The revelation later that the attack was permitted by the governor unleashed a storm of criticism, starting with

Juma Khan Rezai at his niece's grave in Ghazni. (Photo: Alizada)

His demand was echoed by Hamida Gulestani, the head of the security division of the Ghazni Provincial Council, who said that the governor had “explicitly violated the laws of Afghanistan.”

“The Governor of Ghazni must pay for the blood of these people because he caused the death [and injury] of these people,” said Ms Gulestani.
“I strongly condemn this and he should be prosecuted,” agreed Nafisa Azimi, a member of the national parliament for the province. “The governor should be asked whether he is the representative of the people of Ghazni or the Taliban, and he should be held to account for this family’s loss.”

Political analyst Wahid Muzhda said the act of allowing enemy action was not only illegal but an indication that the government of Ghazni “has completely collapsed.”

“This is not peace but a compromise,” Muzhda said, adding that it was common practice in a number of provinces for governors to use operational funds to bribe the Taliban not to attack while they are in office.

The governor and his allies stand firm

The rocket controversy came six weeks before the September assassination in Kabul of Burhannudin Rabbani, the head of the Afghan High Peace Council. The Taliban leadership later retracted an initial claim to have carried out the suicide bombing that killed President Hamid Karzai’s chief peace envoy in contacts with insurgent forces. But his death cast considerable doubts on the prospects for negotiating an end to the fighting.
In Ghazni, the provincial office of the High Peace Council has frequently been criticized for its lack of accomplishments. When asked about the rocketing, members of the body quickly pointed to recent claimed successes.

“In the past, rockets were fired every day in Ghazni, but [over the past six months of] this year, the Taliban were talked to in this regard and only two rockets were fired,” said Ghani Bahaduri, the head of the secretariat of the council’s local office.

Concerning the decision to allow the two-rocket attack, Bahaduri said he had not been consulted and thought this may have been a “a slip of the tongue” on Akbarzada’s part.

As tragic as the incident was, one should not forget the bigger picture of efforts to bring peace, Bahaduri said: “The local office of the High Peace Council is very active and has made many achievements, including negotiation with 200 opposition forces to stop fighting the government and join the peace process.”

There has been an empty space in Khatera's classroom since July 1. (Photo: Alizada)

“Negotiations with the [local] Taliban have been going well and 200 opposition fighters under two Taliban commanders will join the peace process in the very near future,” said Akbarzada, who has been criticized for his lack of results in brokering any reconcilliation with local insurgent groups or individual fighters.

“These individuals had promised not to fire rockets in the province but came under pressure by their commander who is financed from the [Pakistani] side of the border of Afghanistan. In order to mitigate the amount of pressure upon them, I permitted them to fire two rockets at Ghazni.”

Emphasis had been placed on the rockets being fired at non-residential areas to avoid innocent bloodshed, Akbarzada said, adding that he would see that Khatera’s family receives compensation for their losses and the damage to their home.

But however it is explained and compensated, the incident reflects badly on the governor, say his critics.

“The governor of Ghazni Province does not consult with the provincial council on any issue and he did not inform us of his allowing the Taliban to fire rockets,” said Abdul Wali Khan Zada, the secretary of the Provincial Council. “The government should bring peace to people, and peace through firing rockets is not possible.”

Taliban dismisses reconciliation claim
Meanwhile, a spokesman for the Taliban leadership denied that there would be any reconciliation by insurgent forces active in Ghazni.

“The governor of Ghazni has not talked to any member of the Taliban,” Zabiullah Mujahid said in a telephone interview. “The Taliban are never willing to side with government, and those who are willing to join the government are not real Taliban.”

Regarding the July rocket strike, the spokesman said Taliban units were under instructions not to target residential areas but that rockets fired at police stations and other legitimate targets could cause collateral damage.

Local Taliban commanders contacted declined to speak about the issue.

Picking up the pieces

Khatera’s father is still on another continent and has been unable to come back to face the tragic injustice that has torn apart his family. His daughter is dead, his wife and two of his sons are still being treated for their injuries in a Kabul hospital. His brother is trying to keep the family together, but it is a struggle.

Ghazni Governor Musa Khan Akbarzada explains his decision to allow local Taliban to fire rockets at Ghazni city, providing that they "exercise all caution."

“We have been wandering lost for the last three months, and we urge the governor of Ghazni to pay for the blood of Khatera, the damage to our house, and every other loss inflicted upon us,” said Juma Khan Rezai. “If I get to meet him, I will ask him why he destroyed our house, why did he did not order the Taliban to fire rockets at his own home?”

Nonetheless, the family has tried to resume something resembling a normal life, scraping together enough money to repair the house damage. But they feel the pain of the absent injured family members and of the little girl’s loss every day.

“I loved my granddaughter so much, she loved to study and wanted to become a doctor in the future,” said Khatera’s sixty-year-old grandmother Setarah.

The death is also acutely felt at her school, where teachers had high hopes of her.

“Khatera was very smart and never missed classes,” remembered Hawa Gul, who taught her for two years. “She liked mathematics, Dari literature and history, and wanted to become a good doctor and serve her people.”

There is not much space in the classroom where Khatera used to study, seated on the floor like the other girls. But her friends cherish her memory,and still keep her place vacant.

**********

Ghazni Governor Musa Khan Akbarzada gives a public explanation of his decision to allow the July 1 rocketing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hOUdWVGR0AE

(Text in translation): “In the past six months we did not witness any rocket attacks against the city. Frankly speaking, yes there were two rockets, people might be surprised by what I am saying, but yes I permitted [the Taliban] to fire two rockets at the city. Those people whose minds we have won over and those people who had contacts with us did not want to fire rockets at this Muslim city but they were under pressure from their command centre. They contacted me and I told them that they should exercise all caution and that it is OK to fire a couple of rockets at the city.”

Screening introduces by Vikki Riley, art curator and English editor of Kabul Press.

Massacre and Mass Rape in Afshar (February 10-11, 1993)

The Afshar operation of February 1993 represented the largest and most integrated use of military power undertaken by the ISA up to that time. There were two tactical objectives to the operation. First, Massoud intended, through the operation to capture the political and military headquarters of Hizb-i Wahdat, (which was located in the Social Science Institute, adjoining Afshar, the neighborhood below the Afshar mountain in west Kabul), and to capture Abdul Ali Mazari, the leader of Hizb-i Wahdat. Second, the ISA intended to consolidate the areas of the capital directly controlled by Islamic State forces by linking up parts of west Kabul controlled by Ittihad-i Islami with parts of central Kabul controlled by Jamiat-i Islami. Given the political and military context of Kabul at the time, these two objectives (which were largely attained during the operation) provide a compelling explanation of why the Islamic State forces attacked Afshar.

Responsibility for the abuses committed during the operation

The forces that launched the offensive in west Kabul on February 10-11, 1993 all formally belonged to the ministry of defense of the ISA. The minister of defense and de facto commander-in-chief of the ISA at the time of the Afshar operation was Ahmad Shah Massoud. He had overall responsibility for planning and command of military operations. He directly controlled the Jamiat-i Islami units and indirectly controlled the Ittihad-i Islami unit. Massoud secured the participation of the Ittihad-i Islami units through agreement with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the leader of the party. Although the Ittihad units had been given Afghan Army formation numbers, commanders in the field took their orders from senior Ittihad commanders and Sayyaf himself. Sayyaf acted as the de facto general commander of Ittihad forces during the operation and was directly in touch with senior commanders by radio. In this sense, Sayyaf shares equal command and control responsibility with the top Jamiat military leadership.

Given the pattern of violence and ethnic tension that had preceded the operation, the general commanders could and should have anticipated the pattern of abuse that would result when launching an offensive into a densely populated Hazara majority area.. Furthermore, as fighting took place in an area barely two kilometers from the general command post, and field commanders were equipped with radio communications, the general commander must have known of the abuses taking place in Afshar as soon as they started. Both Massoud, together with his senior commanders, and Sayyaf failed to take effective measures to prevent abuses before the operation commenced, or to stop them once the operation was underway.
While it has not been possible to identify individual commanders responsible for specific instances of execution or rape, the Afghanistan Justice Project has been able to identify a number of the commanders who led troops in the operation. Testimony indicates that both Jamiat and Ittihad troops committed abuses. Although some of the commanders were only involved in legitimate military actions, capturing and securing a designated objective, commanders who took place in the operation on the ground have a case to answer to determine whether they restrained their troops from abuses, or whether they and their men actively participated in the summary executions, rape, arbitrary detentions and other abuses that occurred during the operation.

The Islamic State, through Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud and leader of factional ally, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, committed the following military forces to participate in the Afshar operation.

Jamiat-i Islami commanders and units

Mohammad Qasim Fahim, director of intelligence, with responsibility for special operations in support of the offensive and participating in planning of the operation. Anwar Dangar, commander of a division level unit of mujahidin from Shakkar Darra, Shamali, named by numerous witnesses as leading troops in Afshar that carried out abuses on the first two days of the operation.

Mullah Izzat, commander of a division level unit of mujahidin, from Paghman, named by numerous eye witnesses as leading troops in Afshar that carried out abuses on the first two days of the operation.

Mohammad Ishaq Panshiri, commander of a brigade level unit of mujahidin (lewa) that, according to witnesses, participated in the assault Haji Bahlol Panshiri, commander of a brigade level unit (lewa) that, according to witnesses participated in the assault Baba Jullunder Panshiri, commander of a brigade level unit (lewa) that participated in the assault Khanjar Akhund, Panshiri, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund) that participated in the assault Mushdoq Lalai, battalion level, participated in the assault Baz Mohammad Ahmadi Badakhshani, commander of a division level unit that participated in the assault, attacking from Qargha

Ittihad-i Islami commanders and units participating in the operation

Haji Shir Alam, division commander affiliated to Sayyaf, from Paghman, named by numerous eye witnesses as leading troops in Afshar on the first two days when abuses were committed
Zulmai Tufan, commander of the Lewa 597 brigade, named by numerous eye witnesses as leading troops in Afshar on the first two days, when abuses were committed. (Lewa 597 existed before the fall of Dr. Najibullah’s government when it was called Lewa Moradat-Tank). It was in based in the Company area of west Kabul.
Dr. Abdullah, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund) of the Lewa 597, named by several witnesses as leading troops in Afshar on day one and two, when abuses were committed Jaglan Naeem, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund) of the Lewa 597, had stationed troops in Afshar by second day of the operation
Mullah Taj Mohammad, named as participating in planning of the operation
Abdullah Shah, named by several witnesses as leading troops in Afshar and responsible for arbitrary arrests, abductions and other abuses.

Khinjar, who had stationed troops in Afshar by the second day of the operation

Abdul Manan Diwana, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund), named by witnesses as stationing troops in Afshar by the second day of the operation
Amanullah Kochi, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund), had stationed troops in Afshar by second day of the operation
Shirin, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund), had stationed troops in Afshar by the second day of the operation
Mushtaq Lalai, commander of a battalion level unit (ghund), had stationed troops in Afshar by the second day of the operation
Mullah Kachkol, had stationed troops in Afshar by second day of the operation
Narrative of the operation
All of the forces that ultimately participated in the fighting on February 10-11, 1993, were already deployed in and around Kabul before the start of the offensive. The main preparations made by the ISA were the conduct of special operations to weaken the Hizb-i Wahdat defenses and deployment of additional artillery for the bombardment. As director of intelligence, Mohammad Fahim had overall responsibility for special operations. His personnel contacted a number of the Shia commanders around Afshar and obtained their commitment to cooperate with the Islamic State offensive.
The most significant new deployment of artillery before the operation was the position on Aliabad Hill. Massoud pre-positioned a Z0 23 gun there, with the detachment of 30 men, to target the area around the Central Silo, Afshar, Kart-iSeh, Kart-iChar and Kart-iSakhi.
The main significance of the massive firepower and the large number of positions from which artillery was used is that they demonstrate the scale and significance of the operation. This was not a raid or skirmish but a full scale battle, in which the Islamic State deployed the combined military resources from the old Soviet era army and the mujahidin against targets within the capital city, all of them located in areas that were primarily residential, with the civilian population intact.
Witnesses who were associated with the military at the time of the operation have provided accounts of the planning and military coordination that Massoud undertook prior to actually launching the operation on the ground. However, this represents only a partial view of the planning, as an operation of this scale must have involved intensive preparations. According to one witness, the top Jamiat commanders, along with selected senior Ittihad commanders (Shir Alam and Zulmai Tufan), and with the main Shia ally, Massoud Hussain Anwari, plus the ISA military advisors, met under the chairmanship of Massoud at Corps headquarters in Badambagh two days before the operation. Another meeting was held in an intelligence safe house in KartiParwan, near the Intercontinental hotel, on the night before the offensive. Massoud used the same house as an operations room for much of the day. There was also a meeting of the Ittihad commanders, under the chairmanship of Sayyaf, in Paghman, one day before the operation. The purpose of these meetings was to instruct key commanders on their role in the ground offensive.

The ISA forces commenced a generalized bombardment of west Kabul on the night of February 10-11, 1993, with targets both around the Social Science Institute and Afshar and in the rest of the Shia areas of the city. Troop movement started around 05.00 on February 11, and this is generally remembered as the time of the full commencement of the operation. The first decisive troop movement was from Badambagh to the top of the Radar Hill, part of the Afshar ridge. ISA troops were immediately able to take over positions along the top of the ridge unopposed and the main Hizb-i Wahdat defense posts there were burned and the tanks stationed there immobilized.
A large contingent of both Ittihad and Jamiat forces advanced towards Afshar from the west. The closest point of the front line to the main target of the operation was the Kabul Polytechnic. A Jamiat force advanced along the main Afshar Road, from Kart-iParwan and the Intercontinental Hotel, towards the Social Science Institute, entering Afshar from the east. The ISA forces did not advance along other sections of the front line marking the west Kabul enclave, although they maintained an intense bombardment and had ample forces deployed to maintain a threat of advance.

However, by 13.00 Hizb-i Wahdat’s main defense line along the Afshar ridge was gone and their hold on the Social Science Institute untenable. Mazari and his top commanders fled the Institute on foot. By 14.00 the ISA forces were able to occupy the Social Science Institute, and the forces that had advanced from the east and the west, met up in Afshar, having taken effective control of the area. They deployed in Khushal Mina and Afshar, but made no further advance.

Troops started to secure the area, establishing posts and undertaking a search operation. It was this search operation that rapidly became a mass exercise in abuse and looting, as described in the civilian eyewitness testimony below.

Mazari was able to order the re-establishment of the defense line along the edge of Khushhal Mina, next to the Central Silo and Kart-iSakhi, thus retaining most of the rest of west Kabul. Some of the Afshar residents, basically those considering themselves most vulnerable, managed to flee with the departing Wahdat troops (this factor seems to account for the relatively low number of male youths mentioned in the casualties in the testimony). However, the majority of the Afshar civilian population was in place as the ISA forces took over. Because of the bombardment, active fighting and presence of potentially hostile troops, it seems that many civilians were unable to leave on the first day of the operation. However, a mass exodus took place on the night of the February 11-12. Women and children fled mainly towards Taimani, in north Kabul, and they found shelter in schools and mosques in the Ismaili quarter there. Some old men elected to stay and guard houses and possessions, but testimony indicates that the troops mainly targeted men for arbitrary detention and summary execution, i.e. male civilians were not free to leave the area. Most survivors who fled Afshar described seeing debris and corpses along the way, indicating that they fled after the main battle. By the end of the second day, the bulk of the civilian population had evacuated Afshar and it seems that this exodus was the development that most decisively ended abuses against civilians in the area.

On the second day of the operation, February 12, Massoud convened a meeting in the Hotel Intercontinental which, belatedly, discussed arrangements for security in the newly captured areas. This meeting was attended by top ISA military commanders and political figures, including Rabbani, Sayyaf, Hayatollah Mohsin, Ayatollah Fazl, and General Fahim. ISA did claim a Shia constituency and Hussain Anwari, as a senior ISA commander, was under pressure from Shia civilians to make some arrangements for their safety. The meeting ordered a halt to the massacre and looting and agreed on an exchange of envoys between the warring parties, for identification of prisoners. It also called for a withdrawal of the offensive troops, leaving a smaller force to garrison the new areas.
Given the scale of abuses that occurred on the first two days of the operation, before the meeting, it was clearly too late to prevent the main abuses. The meeting also seems to have been ineffective in halting the looting of the area, as the destruction of housing in Afshar happened largely after the meeting.

The War Crimes: Indiscriminate Attacks, Rapes, Abductions and Summary Executions

Indiscriminate Shelling and bombardment of civilian areas

The Afshar area was subjected to heavy bombardment during the first day of the operation. The principal military targets would have been the Social Science Institute and the other main Wahdat garrisons. However, the Social Science Institute was never hit. The majority of the rockets, tank shells and mortars fell in civilian residential areas. As the command centers of both the Ittihad and Jamiat forces were within site of Afshar, it appears that the attack was intended to drive the civilian population from Afshar—which it succeeded in doing. The number killed in the assault (not including those summarily executed) is not known. Virtually every witness interviewed by the Afghanistan Justice Project described seeing bodies in the area.
Indeed, the shelling and mortar fire was so intense, many residents hid on the first day, and did not try to leave. Although this may have reduced civilian casualties from the bombardment, it left these civilians vulnerable to the abuses that followed.

Summary Executions and Disappearances

As noted above, the parties to the conflict were bound by Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits summary executions, torture and hostage taking. Witnesses interviewed by the Afghanistan Justice Project stated that a group of Hizb-i Wahdat soldiers was taken prisoner from Wahdat headquarters at the Social Science Institute by Ittihad-i Islami forces on February 11. In addition to these, a large number of civilian men and suspected Wahdat militants were arrested from the Afshar area after Ittihad captured it. The number taken is not known. One group of Hazara prisoners held by Ittihad-i Islami was subsequently used by the Ittihad commanders to undertake burial of the dead from the Afshar operation, after one week.

This group of witnesses has reported that their relatives were among the civilian and military prisoners taken by Ittihad who subsequently disappeared and are believed to have been summarily executed by Ittihad forces. The Afghanistan Justice Project has been able to obtain only a few of the names of the victims. Some other men were taken from their homes.

Witness A told the Afghanistan Justice Project that he and his family had tried to escape, but the rocketing and shelling was too intense. “We ran to my mother-in-law’s house and hid there. Other people told us that people were being killed on the roads. Eventually a few other families joined us. We could hear the radios of some of the Sayyaf people and they were being warned not to start fighting over the loot. The armed men – who were from Sayyaf and from Jamiat – were looting all the houses. Sayyaf’s people spoke Pushto; Jamiat spoke Dari. I sent my family to another place and I stayed at the house. At about 11:00 a.m. a commander named Izatullah (from Ittihad) came to the house with about ten other armed men. I had left the door open hoping the militias would think the house empty. They came in and beat me and took me to Qargha river where I was put into a container with about 60-65 men. It was very crowded.

Sometimes some men were taken out and made to do work, like chop wood.” After a week the prisoners were all told how much they would have to pay to be released. The witness was told he would have to pay $5000. He told them he did not have that much money, but friends in Paghman came and paid for his release.
Witness B told the Afghanistan Justice Project that Ittihad-i Islami troops had beaten her and arrested her unarmed husband from their residence in Afshar, and that he was still accounted for.
Witness C told the Afghanistan Justice Project that the soldiers searched the houses looking for men. “I was taken to Paghman. At night I was kept in a container; during the day I and other 10-20 men were made to dig trenches. There were lots of containers. At night some men would be taken out and not come back. We could hear shots and we assumed the men had been killed. I think some were buried in the trenches. I finally escaped by hiding in the river under a bridge. I left and went to Quetta.”

Witness M. told the Afghanistan Justice Project that at 7:.00 in the morning, when Ittihad-i Islami captured Afshar, a group of armed men entered her residential compound, and detained S., her husband. They released him after 45 days. He had been beaten so severely his hearing had been permanently damaged and he was deaf. According to his wife, he also had difficulty recognizing people. After he was detained, a second group of 10-15 Ittihad soldiers came to the house between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. They claimed that they were looking for Wahdat forces, they grabbed M.’s son by the arm. “My son was about 11 years old. They held him and asked where his father was. They aimed their guns at him and I threw myself over him. I was shot in the hand and leg but he was shot five times. He died.” The soldiers then took the family belongings and left.

Witness K, 75 years old, stated that troops affiliated to Sayyaf abducted him from Sar-i Jui, Afshar on the day of the Afshar operation, February 11. He was one of a group of seven men who were taken prisoner, and beaten severely and made to act as porters to help carry goods being looted from Afshar. The Ittihad troops then took him to Company (a Sayyaf-controlled area) on that day and held him there for two months. The commander who captured him was Ghulam Rasool, affiliated to Sayyaf. He stated that after that he spent two months in Shakar Darra as a prisoner of Anwar Dangar, and then three months in Farzah with Commandant Haneef. He witnessed the troops summarily executing one of his relatives, Qambar Zohar.

Witness G was briefly arrested and beaten unconscious by Ittehad troops on the first day of the operation. When he returned to the area later he removed two bodies from his well, and estimates that he saw 30-35 bodies himself while fleeing the area (including a decapitated head left in a window).

Abdullah Khan, of Ghazni Province, 67 years old, was arrested from Afshar by Commander Aziz Banjar, a Sayyaf commander. The rest of the family had fled to Taimani during the main military operation. Abdullah Khan had stayed on in Afshar to guard the household goods. However, all household goods were stolen during the operation and the house was destroyed. The family has have been unable to trace Abdullah Khan and so he remains missing.
Witness Sh. told the Afghanistan Justice Project that when Ittihad forces entered her house, they beat to death her father inside the compound. They then stole all household belongings.

Rape by Ittihad Forces

During the Afshar operation, Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami forces used rape and other assaults on civilians to drive the civilian population from the area. The Afghanistan Justice Project interviewed many witnesses who described incidents of rape by Ittihad forces during the Afshar operation. Witness M. (see statement above) was injured in the hand and leg when Ittihad soldiers shot her son. She stated: “While I was still bleeding they raped me.” She stated that three soldiers held her down while the fourth raped her in the basement of her own house. Several other women had also taken shelter in M.’s house: a neighbor, Z., and her two daughters, and another woman, R. The Ittihad troops raped Z.’s two daughters, ages 14 and 16, and the woman, R. The soldiers took them by turn down to the basement to carry out the rape. One of Z.’s daughters was injured by a bayonet when she attempted to resist.
Another witness, S., stated that armed men had burst into her house at Afshar-Silo on the second day of the Afshar operation. They beat and raped her and her sister in their house and looted the contents.
Witness Sh. stated that after capturing Afshar, Ittehad-i Islami troops forcibly entered her house at 7:00 a.m. They raped four girls in their residential compound, including Sh. her sister, age 14 years, and two others.

There were many other reports of rape; the numbers of women raped is not known. Residents of Afshar did not return until after 2001. As of mid-2005, the area remains largely flattened, although some former residents have returned to the ruins of their former homes.

Source: The Afghanistan Justice Project

By Manzoor Qadir

ISLAMABAD: Human Rights Watch, an NGO keeping a watch on gross human rights violations in Balochistan, has asked the United States to take action against the crimes taking place in the province.

The crimes include extra-judicial killings, torture, illegal detention, disappearances and forced displacement.

In a detailed report complied by HRW Pakistan Director Ali Dayan Hasan, it has been recommended that the US government press Pakistan to take all necessary measures to end the violations and fully investigate and prosecute all those responsible for the crimes.

The report states that many government agencies such as the ISI, IB, Frontier Corps, police and other such groups are responsible for many of the violations and demands the government take action and warn the culpable agencies.

The report further suggests that US should urge the government to suspend police and military assistance and cooperation programmes with the Frontier Corps, police, and Pakistan Army units based in Balochistan until military and civilian authorities fully investigate and take appropriate action against those committing the crimes.

The report wants Pakistan to implement effective mechanisms in place to ensure that no security unit funded or trained by the US is responsible for human rights violations and that adequate vetting and oversight mechanisms are in place to help deter abuses in the future.

The HRW further recommends that the US urge the Pakistan government to investigate alleged human rights abuses committed by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other banned groups and hold those responsible to account, particularly those who have committed serious crimes in Balochistan such as the killings of several Shias.

It also demands that the Pakistan government take urgent measures to protect members of the Shia community and other vulnerable groups in Balochistan and across Pakistan and that the US government should also urge Baloch nationalist groups to cease attacks and threats against all civilians, particularly non-Baloch residents of the province.

Widespread fear of harassment, discrimination and killings has prompted some Shia community members living in Balochistan to consider leaving the country, even by illegal means.

Human rights groups say over 600 Hazaras have been killed since 2000. Media reports speak of dozens recently killed in attacks on the community in Quetta and in other parts of the province.

HRW states that their research indicates that at least 275 Shias have been killed in sectarian attacks in Balochistan alone since 2008.

The group has also urged the government to act against those illegally ferrying people out of the country in exchange for large sums of money.

The report further states that the government should take appropriate disciplinary action against group members who order or participate in attacks on civilians.

The HRW, in the report, discusses the political, economic, geographical and demographical aspects of the province in details. It reveales that the province has historically had a tense relationship with the federal government, due to issues of provincial autonomy, control of mineral resources and exploration, and a strong sense of deprivation and exploitation.

The Human Rights Watch also interviewed teachers, government officials, journalists, non-governmental organisations, and school children, who described attacks on Balochistan’s educational facilities, teaching personnel, and students as part of broader political, religious, and cultural division.

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The genocide of Hazaras in Pakistan is connected to massacre, persecution of Hazaras and systematic discrimination against them in Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN: Quetta’s Hazara community living in fear

QUETTA, 7 February 2012 (IRIN) - Widespread fear of harassment, discrimination and killings has prompted some Hazara community members living in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan Province in southwestern Pakistan, to consider leaving the country, even by illegal means.

“Over 600 Hazaras have been killed since 2000,” Abdul Qayuum Changezi, head of the Hazara Jarga, a group representing Hazaras, told IRIN. Media reports speak of dozens recently killed in attacks on the community in Quetta and in other parts of the province.

The Hazaras constitute a distinct ethnic group, with some accounts tracing their history to central Asia. Almost all belong to the Shia Muslim sect, speak a dialect of Farsi, and are concentrated in central Afghanistan and some parts of Pakistan. There are some 6,000 to 7,000 Hazaras in the country, according to a Hazara chief, Sardar Saadat Ali.

In Quetta, many of them live in Alamdar Road. Close by, Ali Hassan, 55, and his two sons, both in their 20s, were engrossed in a fierce argument in their small house – when IRIN visited – about leaving the country, even if illegally.

According to the two, there is too much discrimination against the Hazaras for them to have a future. “It is simply too dangerous to live here. Besides, Hazaras get no opportunities in education or for jobs, because of the bias that exists,” said Ibrar Ali, 21, the younger of Hassan’s sons.

However, their parents were terrified of allowing them to try and leave, mainly because of an incident in December last year in which at least 55 Hazaras from Quetta were killed when a boat carrying some 90 illegal immigrants to Australia capsized off the coast of Indonesia.

“The boat was overloaded with over 250 people, including children and women,” said Nasir Ali, whose brother was on the ill-fated boat, but survived.

“Persecution”

Following the incident, the autonomous Human Rights Commission of Pakistan demanded a government inquiry. In a statement, HRCP chairperson Zohra Yusuf said the fact that “Hazara young men chose to leave Pakistan by taking such grave risks is a measure of the persecution the Hazara community has long faced in Balochistan.”

The statement also urged the government to act against those illegally ferrying people out of the country in exchange for large sums of money, and demanded it “take urgent steps to find a way to put an end to the persecution of the long-suffering Hazara community”.

The New York based monitoring body Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also condemned the sectarian killing of Shia Muslims in Pakistan, and has noted: “Research indicates that at least 275 Shias, mostly of Hazara ethnicity, have been killed in sectarian attacks in the southwestern province of Balochistan alone since 2008.” HRW Asia director Brad Adams says a start can be made to ending such killings “by arresting extremist group members responsible for past attacks”.

Anger within the Hazara community runs deep, and has been growing.

“The news of the killings and the desperation of the community is terrible. I weep often when I read of what is happening. I want to return to Quetta, because I love my home town; I want to be close to my parents and live there with my own family. But my fiancé and I ask if it will be sensible to raise our children in a climate of death,” Mina Ali, a medical student from the Hazara community currently based in Karachi, told IRIN.

Her fiancé, also a Hazara, is keen to try and flee the country, whether “legally or illegally”, Mina said.

“Genocide”?

Statements to the media from top government officials, including the chief minister of Balochistan, have also been perceived as insensitive in their failure to strongly condemn killings that some commentators have described as a “genocide”. Others in Pakistan are demanding that the International Court of Justice look into the matter.

Hazara chief Sardar Saadat Ali, a former provincial minister, told IRIN most Hazaras in the country were based in Quetta but there were “also some in Hyderabad [in Sindh Province] and other Baloch districts”.

Ali, who has lost close relatives including his brother in targeted killings of Hazaras, said: “We can expect nothing from the government; so we act for ourselves. I personally went to Indonesia to bring back the bodies of the young Hazara men who had died in the boat tragedy. They were fleeing because of the security situation and in search of a chance to gain an education.”

Hazaras, he added, were being targeted on “both ethnic and sectarian grounds” by extremist groups – mainly the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba, which have origins in the Punjab. He was also concerned about further persecution if the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan.

“I don’t understand much about politics, but I worry constantly for my grown children, and their children,” said Zareen Bibi, 60, a Hazara resident of Quetta. “Too many Hazaras have died, for no reason – and this inhumanity has to end. We all deserve dignity and the right to life.”

kh/eo/cb

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A Hazara family. Photo by Najibullah Musafer

Here is 1391 national budget draft sent to parliament.

Related story :

Human Security, Peacebuilding, and the Hazara Minority of Afghanistan

Department of Political Science
Master’s Thesis in Global Studies
Supervisor: Ted Svensson
Lund University

In person, Hussain Sadiqi appears to be anything but a competitive and political fighter. I met him and the film’s director, Gavain Browne, on left, at the SBIFF press breakfast at the Canary Hotel Saturday morning.

They were both quietly perched in the corner of the banquet room, observing the crowds, looking like shy newcomers to the film scene. I eventually pushed my way over to them for introductions. Sadiqi and Browne were both extremely friendly and forward, but not overbearing at all. They were eager to tell their story. Both reside in Australia, Sadiqi in Perth and Browne in Sydney.

This is their first time in Santa Barbara for the Film Festival and they were thrilled by the Spanish architecture, the glorious weather, and how friendly everyone had been to them. As a Santa Barbara native, I can’t stop myself from offering suggestions on hidden gems to see about town. We walked through historic el Paseo, had a coffee at the eclectic Handlebar Coffee shop, and a browse through the farmers’ market to sample locally grown pistachios.

Eventually, we settled down at the Taqueria Rincon Alteno for sample a variety of delicious street tacos and a cup of horchata. Sadiqi picked up quickly on the salsa bar, reminiscing about the spicy Afghan food he grew up on as he drizzled a hot roasted chile sauce on his asada and lengua tacos and squeezed over a wedge of lime.

Sadiqi has an intense story to tell, and his words, the music, the cinematography of The Art of Fighting, is well composed and captivating. His body has a sleek and fluid movement, whether he’s stretching in a grassy field or sparring in a gritty rooftop fight scene with two opponents. After fighting, the men sit down and share food with each other.

There’s hope in finding common ground among political strife and Hussain Sadiqi is using his shaolin kung fu skills to get it. He wants to be a hero for Afghanistan. If his strength and skill doesn’t overwhelm you, his smile will certainly disarm you.
The Art of Fighting is part of the Short Docs series. It screens with five other documentaries. This is its US Premiere.

28 January, 4:00 PM, Santa Barbara Museum of Art
2 February, 7:00 PM, Santa Barbara Museum of Art

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